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## RECENT TENDENCIES IN SOCIOLOGY. II.\*

### III.

#### ORIGINAL DIFFERENCES IN POPULATION.

*To account for certain groupings, oppositions, and interactions by original differences in persons.†*

The earlier sociologists were handicapped by their ignorance of the qualitative differences in a population. Comte ignores them entirely. Schäffle confesses: "The classification of population according to intellectual, æsthetic, and moral traits is difficult. These traits have not yet been sufficiently observed. We have, therefore, to leave at this point an unfillable gap." Mr. Spencer develops quite fully the differences — physical, emotional, and intellectual — between primitive men and the culture races; but a modern social population presents itself to him as relatively homogeneous. The differences he makes use of are not qualitative, but quantitative; *i.e.*, differences in degree of strength or ability or enlightenment. Even here he has not gone far enough to please all, and Mr. Mallock has formally impeached him for greatly undervaluing and understating the rôle of the exceptional man in social evolution.

Now the moment the sociologist undertakes "to explain social phenomena," he is staggered by the variety of reaction, the unlikeness of response to like stimulus, exhibited in a given group. Here are contrasts of devout

\* Errata in first paper of this series : —

p. 545, line 30, for "helpless" read *helpful*.

p. 548, line 15, for "Pot" read *Post*.

p. 549, last line, for "compound" read *component*.

p. 559, line 28, for "riots" read *roots*.

† See appended bibliography, III.

with undevout, of back-lookers (traditionalists) with fore-lookers, of forth-faring with barnacles, of spenders with savers, of risk-lovers with risk-shunners, of sporting with Puritanic. Have these all been differentiated out of a homogeneous population by environment, circumstance, or training? Do men draw apart into conservatives and radicals solely from personal or class interest? Can we explain such oppositions as Cavalier and Roundhead, conformist and dissenter, stalwart and mugwump, in terms of surroundings? Are Salvationists and Presbyterians merely different forms of the same human material? Is it addiction to unlike activities that explains the contrast of bellicose and peace-loving?

This wealth of contrast the sociologist can lay to the differences of place and function in society only so long as he sticks to the panoramic. The moment he condescends to the details of the Here and Now he finds the method too simple. It is like undertaking to copy an elaborate picture in mosaic, with bits of stone of different sizes, but of the same color and shape.

It is easy to show that variety in the elements of a population enriches social life. Of all communities a mining settlement is, perhaps, the least interesting to a sociologist, because its characteristics reflect so faithfully the characteristics of its members. Now into this assemblage of men introduce an equal number of women. Soon we have new conventions—modesty, chivalry—and new institutions—marriage, law of domestic relations, the home. With the advent of children fresh complications arise,—age of consent, laws of inheritance, educational ideals and activities. Let there be added to the gold-seeking type the religious, artistic, and intellectual types in the form of evangelists, poets, painters, philosophers and scientists. At once you have a circle of new activities, interests, and interactions. If now you pile all this fabric on another and lower race,—say negroes or Chinese,

— you have a fresh growth of conventions and institutions governing the relations of the upper and the lower castes.

Now with every step in this process the whole takes on character of its own, and is less and less to be conceived as an average or a resultant of its parts. A social physiognomy appears, which derives not from the qualities of the population, but from the relations and interactions arising out of the contrasts of sex, age, type, and race it contains. The conventions and institutions generated by the sex difference or the race difference will be much the same, whether the persons are A's and B's in England or X's and Y's in Yucatan. To just this variety of materials in a society is due, perhaps, that profusion of forms which makes a social life rich and interesting.

Since social phenomena betray the interaction of unlike elements, it behooves us to examine the persistent differences in the individuals that compose a society. Population may look gray from a distance; but from near by it is seen to be made up of multi-colored particles, which, when grouped like with like, give rise to all manner of contrasts and effects. It is careful inspection and analysis of population that alone can enable the sociologist to cope with social reality.

The influence of certain sex contrasts upon early social development has been clearly set forth by Professor Thomas. He points out that females store up energy, while males expend energy. Hence the one sex is passive, the other active; the one is physiologically conservative, the other variative. From this fundamental contrast flow interesting consequences. The association that men develop has reference to food supply; and its features — such as mutual aid, division of labor, exchange, commerce — are but a veiled struggle making for toleration, but not for social sentiment. The latter originates in reproductive activities. The first group is not the family, but the mother and her children; and the first tribe is an aggregation of those

related by blood to a group of females. Humanitarian sentiments have developed upon maternal affection, and political organization upon the association of kindred. Since man's katabolism disposed him to exploit and violence while woman's anabolism disposed her to a stationary life, the primitive division of labor lay between the sexes, man taking to war and the chase, woman to agriculture and the house industries. This is why, as Professor Mason has shown, the development of the early arts and industries has been due to woman.

Male restlessness leads to exogamy, from which practice it results that a man must mate only with a woman of another group, while she stays in her own group and receives her husband as a guest. The children remain with the mother group, and thus arises the metronymic system of kinship and the metronymic clan. Patient research has uncovered traces of these in the culture of every civilized people.

While the maternal system veils male force without annulling it, it certainly procures for woman a higher status than the patriarchal system that succeeds. By blood brotherhood, secret societies, tribal marks, and religious dedications, men associate and seek to escape from the tyranny of the maternal system. But it is chronic warfare, which finally develops a strong organization of males, completely shatters the political influence of the female, and reduces her to a position of subjection until other factors than violence come to shape the relation of classes and sexes.

While *sex* is taking on a new significance for sociologists, there is also a tendency to connect social phenomena with *race*. Ferrero has sought to base important moral, industrial, and political contrasts between the societies of northern Europe and those of southern Europe on a difference between the fair and the dark peoples in point of sensuality. Going further, Ammon, Lapouge, Closson,

and Ripley, from extensive observations on head form, have distinguished three leading races in Europe, with unlike psychic characteristics attesting themselves in unlike social traits. At the moment the social psychologists are announcing, "*The nature of the unit derives from the characteristics of the whole*," these "anthropo-sociologists" are declaring, "*The nature of the whole derives from the characteristics of its units*." In a way both theses are true. Custom and convention are the lords of most individual lives, but race and environment are the lords of collective life. Granted that long-headed blond communities are bound to be Protestant, it is still safe to say of the average Norwegian that he is a Protestant because he was reared in Norway, and not in Portugal.

The anthropo-sociologists insist that communities of the long-headed blond race are more progressive, more prosperous, more migrant, and more individualistic than communities of the broad-headed brunets. Furthermore, in communities made up from both races the differentiation in respect to wealth and education, the stratification into classes, and the contrast between city and country will be more pronounced than in communities of either race.

Criminal sociology owes much to the labors of the anthropologists. A couple of centuries ago crime was charged up to personal deviltry. When the subjection of the human will to social conditions and influences began to be realized, thinkers went so far as to deem crime a purely social phenomenon. Criminals are "our failures." "Every society has the criminals it deserves." Lombroso and his school, by discovering among criminals a distinct human variety of an atavistic character, have caused the pendulum to swing back again. A good part of crime and pauperism we now lay to the presence of well-marked types that can be sorted out of the population by mere anthropometry. The effort of Lombroso to show that the genius differs from other men not so much in degree as in

kind and the endeavor of his pupil Nordau to lay certain contemporary æsthetic tendencies at the door of an abnormal human variety, the "degenerates," have been frowned upon by most of their scientific brethren.

Side by side with the anthropologist, busy with his distinctions of *sex*, *race*, and *anthropological type*, has worked the sociologist, clumsily endeavoring to do for himself what the psychologist ought to do for him; namely, to break up population into *psychological types*.

Thus Mr. Brooks Adams has sought to explain the course of European history by postulating different types of men needing different conditions for success. In the earlier stages of social evolution the energies of men are directed by Fear, which, stimulating the imagination, leads to supernatural religion and the rise of a priesthood. In this epoch of vivid imagination the dominant types are the religious, the military, and the artistic. As evolution proceeds; however, Fear dies away and Greed becomes the *primum mobile* in society. This throws into the seats of power the economic type of man, who prevails by money as the priest by incantations and the warrior by arms.

The Barbarians that overran the Roman Empire were ignorant; and, when their imaginations were quickened by Christian supernaturalism, the religious-ecstatic type seized the opportunity and founded the theocracy,—that is to say, the papacy. From the time of Hildebrand the clergy gained upon the laity, the religious upon the secular, and ecclesiastical property upon lay property. The early Crusades and the founding of the great military-religious orders mark the zenith of the emotional type. But in thriving commercial cities, like Venice and Genoa, there was growing up an economic type of man, sceptic and materialist, animated by Greed rather than by Fear, and putting his trust in money rather than in the promises of the priest. After the Crusades the rise of the towns, the spread of banking, the rapid accumulation of wealth, and

the appearance of centralized administrations supported by the florins of the *bourgeoisie* bring this kind of man to the fore. In the conduct of affairs the burgher displaces the religious and the martial types, and the civil state rises out of the decaying feudal system.

Mr. Adams regards the Reformation as an attempt of the economic type to get rid of all fees to middlemen, whether priests or saints, by becoming their own intercessors with the Deity. They substituted the Scriptures for an expensive priesthood, and to the "power of the Keys" asserted by the Church they opposed the doctrine of justification by faith. Thus he strides down the centuries, showing the growing prevalence of the economic type and the increasing mastery of capital over the course of events. "The salient characteristic of our age is the ascendancy of the economic type of man." "Since the Crusades the imagination has slowly faded, until after the last great acceleration marked by the locomotive and electricity it has fallen into contempt." "The spark of faith has flickered so low that capital will no longer hire it even as the Stuarts hired it as an agent of police." "The artist has become the creature of a commercial market." Prose has completely supplanted poetry, "while the economic intellect has grown less tolerant of any departure from those representations of nature which have appealed to the most highly gifted of the moneyed type among successive generations. Hence the imperiousness of modern realism." Greek and Gothic architecture represented imaginative ideals, but since the Reformation "wealth is the form in which energy seeks expression; therefore since the close of the fifteenth century architecture has reflected money."

Piquant as this is, Mr. Adams has neglected to provide for his succession of types a well thought out basis. He does not make clear whether it takes place because the economic type survives while the emotional type starves,



or because commerce and industry transform men from one type into another type, or because the forces of the age elevate to the control of affairs at one time imaginative men and at another time calculating economic men. In this state of vagueness, Mr. Adams's theory cannot be taken as more than a brilliant suggestion.

Professor Patten paves the way for his interpretation of English history by resolving population into four types. The *clingers* are strongly attached to their birthplace, faithful to the customs of their fathers, and loath to migrate. They are born conservatives, never willing to relinquish what they have in order to grasp at a better. Cautious and dependent, they worship the great and swell the admiring retinue of those powerful enough to grant them protection. The *sensualists* are persons whose strong passions prompt them to break away from cramping local conditions in quest of a few dominant pleasures. Reared in a poor environment and insatiable in desire, they make their way into fertile settled regions as conquerors and exploiters. In a composite society they are the risk-takers and adventurers. From their ranks are recruited soldiers, explorers, prospectors, pioneers, and emigrants. They settle new lands, open routes of trade, and organize new industries, pressing ever to the perilous edge where great prizes glitter above great risks.

In a more advanced society appears an offshoot of the sensualists termed the *stalwarts*, from their fidelity to abstract principles. In religion the stalwart makes a fetich of creed, and prides himself on his orthodoxy. His morality is ascetic, a series of "thou shalt not's." In politics he is democratic and Utopian. In industry he is thrifty but not adventurous. The stalwart is a missionary for the cause he believes in, and, if able, crushes whom he cannot convert. He is independent and dislikes middlemen, whether in trade, in politics, or in religion. He is zealous for the Bible, the Constitution, the

moral law, but reads into them his own ideals. The Puritans, the Presbyterians, the Quakers, and later the liberals and the democrats exemplify the stalwart type.

Finally there develop among the leisured, salaried, and professional classes, who, unlike the masses, are shielded from the bitter struggle with external conditions, the *mugwumps*. These ruthlessly dissect and criticise the dogmas and ideals of the multitude, and hence, though few in numbers, exert at times a great influence. They are, in fact, stronger in criticism than in action; for they are too opinionated to act together and carry out a policy of their own. The mugwump is rationalist in opinion and cosmopolitan in sympathies. He dislikes ideals, dogmas, and utopias, and loves to expose sham and cant.

Of these types the first two are original and the last two evidently of later growth. Social history is made by the struggle of these types to impress their respective ideals upon national character. The outcome from age to age changes with the changing conditions of survival. An ultra-Darwinist, Professor Patten watches narrowly the vicissitudes in the food, clothing, housing, and habits of a people, in order to see what kind of man is surviving and what kind dying out. The beginnings of plenty in the Middle Ages decimated the sensualists, and the abstemious Puritan drew to the front by reason of his steady habits. But the indoor Puritans were too ascetic to look after their comfort, and consumption thinned them to the vanishing point. Their impress, however, remained. England adopted their domestic ideal, adding to it outdoor exercise and the bath-tub. "An unbathed Englishman is a sensualist. A bath turns him into a gentle optimist."

Professor Patten has analyzed population as a shrewd and observant field economist rather than as a psychologist of the schools. His classification may not be scientific, but it is practical; and for a first attempt it lights up

matters wonderfully. No student of social theory can afford to neglect it.

Professor Giddings posits four types of character,—the *forceful*, the *convivial*, the *austere*, and the *rationally conscientious*. The *forceful* are fearless, adventure-loving, and fond of athletic exploits, feats of arms, and dangerous occupations. Their amusements are drinking, wrestling, fencing, gambling, dancing, etc. Men of this type take to seafaring, fishery, mining, ranching, and the railroad, fire and police services. The *convivial* man takes to safe, commonplace, profitable occupations. His pleasures are of the sensory and emotional kind. He is *bon vivant*, gambles, frequents races, prize fights, and theatres, but does not care to engage in active sport. The *austere* type is represented by the Puritan and the reformer. Finally, we have the *rationally conscientious* man, who enjoys all pleasures temperately, and has intellectual and scientific tastes. His avocations are literature, art, science, and citizenship.

This classification follows that of Professor Patten save that the clingers are very properly merged with other types and the sensualists are broken up into the forceful and the convivial. Professor Giddings goes on to distinguish four types of intellect and four types of disposition. Uniting these, he undertakes to split up population into four types of mind,—the Ideo-motor, the Ideo-emotional, the Dogmatic-emotional, and the Critical-intellectual.

The lowest is forceful in character and instinctive in its activities. It has few ideas, and these are reached by perception and conjecture. The Ideo-emotional man is convivial, emotional, and suggestible. His intellect is imaginative, he gets his beliefs by suggestion, and he habitually reasons from superficial analogy. The Dogmatic-emotional type is Patten's stalwart. He is austere, domineering, and has fixed beliefs determined not from without, but by his emotions and temperament. He reasons de-

ductively from premises he has accepted on trust. The highest type, the Critical-intellectual, is marked by breadth and balance, clear perceptions, sound judgment, careful reasoning, and critical thinking. The disposition is creative, and the character rationally conscientious.

Professor Giddings has ventured to distribute the population of the United States among these classes, and finds that three per cent. are of the lowest type, and one and a half per cent. of the highest. The Ideo-emotional people are much over a quarter, the Dogmatic-emotional people a fifth, and a third of the population falls between the classes. He even locates the types of character. The forceful congregate about seaboard and lakeboard, in all the mountain regions, and on the great plains. The convivial predominate in the South. The austere are thickest in a broad belt reaching from New England to Iowa and Kansas. The rationally conscientious are found here and there in cities.

In all the foregoing Professor Giddings has simply raised psychology a story higher. But he goes on to exploit the meaning of it for sociology; and in so doing he has made, I think, a first-class contribution to the science. For he finds that the chief stages in social development answer to the predominance of one or another of these types. When people are mainly of the Ideo-emotional sort, their co-operation will be effected through sympathy and will be mobbish. Once mass action of this kind took the form of crusades, insurrections, and revolts. To-day it manifests itself in booms, panics, crazes, political land-slides, sympathetic strikes, and revivals. Control of the individual by spontaneous collective action, such as common ridicule, boycotting, mobbing, and lynching, marks the sympathetic stage of social union.

When the Dogmatic-emotional folk abound, people act in concert not from sympathy, but in consequence of having the same beliefs. When a body of transmitted

beliefs is deeply stamped upon the minds of the young by means of authoritative instruction, we get a conservative society unified and held together by tradition. But it is always possible that new and enthralling dogmas, emanating from superior men and propagated by the zealous, may seize upon the vigorous dogmatic part of the population and draw it into a course of radical action. The prevalence of the dogmatic type in a community is attested by reform agitations of a fanatical sort, by strong partisanship, by deference to tradition and authority, and by reliance upon prohibitory legislation to regulate private conduct. Characteristic of the dogmatic stage of like-mindedness are definite legal rights, formal courts of justice, and political organization.

When the Critical-intellectual element becomes influential, concerted action rests upon deliberate agreement attained through criticism, argument, discussion, and constructive reasoning based upon inductive research. A constant amalgamation of critical judgments with tradition results in unifying tastes, faiths, creeds, standards, ideals, and values. The evidences of this stage are free criticism applied to religion, the development of inductive science, the existence of a scientific political economy, the reliance upon objective evidence in legal procedure, and the habit of free political discussion.

Professor Giddings has given us a spectrum of population as it is, not as it was born. For his schedules are elastic. Some people can and do pass upwards on the scale. Under the electrical action of enlightenment the human ox is acquiring nerves, the flabby emotionalist is becoming vertebrate, the hide-bound dogmatist is limbering up. The higher schedules are filling from the lower, and back of it all lies the ascent of the intellect. The stages in the evolution of the social mind depend on the mental make-up of the population; and this in turn depends on those influences — such as leisure, converse, instruction, discovery

— which develop individual minds. Giddings, then, agrees with Buckle that the tap-root of social progress is intellectual progress. He holds with Comte against Marx, and his “four modes of like-mindedness” is a good substitute for Comte’s “three stages.” At a time when his brethren are precipitately striking their colors to the economic materialists, he sturdily flies the flag of intellectualism. Rightly, too; for there is a movement of the human intellect which has nothing to do with economic facts. The increase of knowledge and the alteration of economic conditions are independent causes of social change. Both are needed, if our science is to move on an even keel. Let intellectualism and economism be the Urim and Thummim of the sociologist.

Ratzenhofer heeds only congenital differences, notes only the clay of human beings, and ignores the form this clay has taken on. This may commend his classification to anthropologists; but to us it means less, seeing that social phenomena depend on people as they are, and not on people as God made them.

Distinguishing in respect to individuality, vitality, sociality, and physical constitution, he forms nine classes. The first class comprises individuals of superior vigor, intellect, and morality. They are masterful, self-assertive, ambitious, optimistic people, eager to cope with difficulties and carve out a place for themselves. They cherish the family ideal, and are good parents. From this class issue intellectual leaders and captains of industry. The second class comprises the multitude of narrow, practical-minded people, animated by their private interest, but still able to co-operate with their fellows. What they can do depends on how they are led. Under superior guidance they are capable of great things; but, if badly led, they soon fall into confusion. The third class embraces the strong, noble, and self-sacrificing, the abler of whom are the moral leaders so long as society is in a healthy condition. They have

largeness of soul, and naturally champion the collective interest. The social welfare depends upon the number and influence of these public-spirited men.

So much for the normal people. The fourth class is composed of persons abnormally egoistic and actuated by greed, ambition, vanity, and malice. They are forceful persons, hard to influence, and dead to moral considerations. Tyrants and demagogues as well as the élite among criminals proceed from this class. From the fifth class, characterized by weakness of individuality and vitality, such men recruit their followers. Its members are selfish, unstable, and weak to resist temptation. Ordinarily, they are held in balance by the better element; but in troublous times they may furnish a dangerous support to the demagogue. A sixth class embraces men of strong individuality and impersonal aims, but lacking in vitality, poise, and common sense. Saints, martyrs, fanatics, ascetics, and other unpractical persons who offer themselves up for an idea represent this type.

The remaining classes comprise the various types of defectives and degenerates.

All manner of momentous social changes flow from changes in the relative size of these classes and from circumstances that give the upper hand now to the constructive and now to the subversive classes. Alternations of stagnation and progress, of vigor and feebleness, of order and anarchy, or of degeneration and regeneration, are the work neither of institutions nor of extraordinary individuals. They are due to the shifting balance between the normal and abnormal elements in the population. For the key to social vicissitudes we must seek among those obscure physiological factors which cause one kind of men to bloom and multiply while another kind perishes.

In view of the leadership of American thinkers in the classifying of population one may wonder if our society does not offer a rare opportunity for such study. In

central and eastern Europe it is not easy for the sociologist to read typical traits, obliterated as they often are by class traits and nationality traits. The individual is a palimpsest of which the earlier writing is undecipherable. In France provincial traits are obtrusive, and one distinguishes local rather than psychological types. But in the United States local types are slow to form. The class stamp is not yet deep. There are millions of individuals bearing the brand of no particular herd. Moreover, great bodies of immigrants are being denationalized. Here, then, if anywhere, is a chance to classify people by traits that antedate social influences and root in mental constitution and temperament.

#### IV.

##### DERIVATIVE DIFFERENCES IN POPULATION.

*To show how well-marked types are created by place, work, social environment and institutions.\**

While social conditions can be shown to flow partly from differences in the population, it is also true, though in a less degree, that diversities in the population can be shown to flow from social conditions, especially those of a fundamental character. Besides original contrasts in type there are derived differences, and recently there is a marked tendency to isolate and explain these derived differences. Mr. Spencer, in accounting for the moral contrast between the members of a militant society and those of industrial society by the contrast of their predominant activities, took a line that is now eagerly followed in the hope of throwing light on the baffling diversity of type and class.

Nowadays the time-honored appeal to race is more and more looked upon as the resource of ignorance or indolence. To the scholar the attributing of the mental and

\* See appended bibliography, IV.



moral traits of a population to heredity is a confession of defeat, not to be thought of until he has wrung from every factor of life its last drop of explanation.

To Vignes and other sociologists of the Le Play school we owe a new way of accounting for local types. The appearance of local and provincial types in a once homogeneous population has always been credited to the environment. But the operation of the physical environment on character is no longer conceived to be so simple and direct as Guyot, Draper, and Buckle assumed. We do not take continents as unit areas of characterization. Religions are not traced to impressions from natural phenomena. The aspect of Nature plays no such rôle as Buckle assigns it. The newer view is that Nature determines Work and Reward. Work in turn fixes habits of life and prescribes the form of land tenure, domicile, family, inheritance, community. These fundamental institutions, acting in conjunction with the two primary factors, create distinctive aptitudes, modes of thinking, customs, prejudices, standards,—in a word, a type of character. The causal series, then, is longer than Montesquieu and Buckle thought, and more like a net of links than a simple chain. Environment is lord of life; but Work, Reward, and Tradition are his viziers.

Nor does one venture nowadays to connect the traits of a vast people with its present physical surroundings. It is only little peoples that can have a special and uniform environment. In the same nation there are a number of distinct *milieux*, each sculpturing the soul of its denizens in its own way. These create local types, but national types can be connected with Nature only by the mediation of such unifying and generalizing factors as tradition, assimilation, national culture, religion, law, or history. The larger and more diversified the area in which a certain set of traits prevails, the more our explanation must lean on race or tradition instead of physical environment.

France, highly diversified geographically and long inhabited by an extremely stable population, abounds in strongly marked local types. On these M. Demolins, the brightest intellect of the Le Play school, has written a book as charming as Dumas and as convincing as Euclid. Much as his "social geography" delights Frenchmen, its interest for us is in his method of accounting for local diversities,—in a word, his social causation.

Take the Auvergnat. Auvergne being a mountainous region, more suited to grazing than to farming, its inhabitants are occupied with stock-raising, especially the raising of fine beeves. The sale of his stock at the local fairs develops in the Auvergnat that peculiar skill in deceiving and bluffing we find in our "horse-trader." This shrewdness in getting the best of a bargain fits him to succeed in town, and stimulates a very lively migration from pastoral Auvergne to the centres of trade. These migrants take to peddling "old clothes" and all branches of the second-hand business, because in this petty commerce their Yankee-like "smartness" finds full scope. For that larger commerce that renounces the special bargain with each customer they have no talent: their peasant cunning does not avail them here. Even when the Auvergnat enters the higher walks, the practical spirit of a bargaining folk shows itself. The great men Auvergne has given to France have been lawyers, soldiers, statesmen, never writers, artists, or orators.

The tap-root of the Provençal type immortalized in Daudet's *Tartarin* is the cultivation of fruit-trees. In sunny Provence nature works almost unaided, and the farmer reduces to a gatherer of olives and almonds. Exempt from the heavy labors of the tiller of the soil, he becomes indolent and easy-going, a lover of leisure and siesta and converse. As the products of his orchards are important articles of export, we find improved ways, developed markets, and a taste for commerce. In fact, horticulture and commerce occupy the population.

Fruit-growing demands personal care rather than large capital and routine labor under skilled direction. It makes for small holdings and a diffused ownership. Hence the Provençals have never been feudalized, have never developed the social hierarchy that has moulded the Norman or English soul. It is their love of equality that has been the mainspring of French republicanism.

Where conditions demand hard work, the energetic refuse to be yoked with the lazy in a communal household. But, in Provence, life is easy ; and so the family remains large and patriarchal. Leisure and communal life foster the gregarious spirit and favor habits of social intercourse. The Provençal is, therefore, sociable to the core ; and the presence of others intoxicates him. He talks all the time, talks in a high voice in order to get a hearing, and habitually draws the long bow that he may attract the attention of his talkative fellows.

Petty horticulture permits agglomeration into towns, and so leads to an extraordinary development of public life. The lively municipal assemblies and agitations of Provence school the Provençals for success in French politics and administration just as the Celtic clan has trained the Irish for the capture of our city governments. A frothy, emotional eloquence, a capacity for prompt cohesion about a leader for the conquest of political spoils, and a belief in the omnipotence of the state,—all these Provençal aptitudes are traced to a mode of livelihood that exempts from hard work.

In Demolins's melting-pot that picturesque type, the Corsican, is resolved into a few simple elements. He is explained by two facts. His Work is Simple Collection,—*i.e.*, grazing and horticulture,—and his Place is neither mountain nor plain, but mountain penetrating and dominating the plain. Like all who live by tending and gathering, the Corsican disdains intense labor, and leaves tillage to immigrating Italians. When he leaves his isle, he passes by

domestic service, agriculture, industry, and commerce to edge his way into the army, the police, or the administration. Since life is not hard, the family community has not been disrupted; and the Corsican remains very sensitive to the ties of blood.

Shaggy mountains, rising abruptly from settled valleys, furnish an ideal refuge to law-breakers, who "take to the brush," and from there prey upon and terrorize the population. Brigandage in turn develops the clan, and the quarrels of individuals become the vendettas of clans. Loyalty and clannishness and constancy in hatred as in friendship thus become the salient features of Corsican character.

The opportunity to practise violence with impunity and the habit of domination,—for the bandits provide chiefs to the clans—develop a spirit which impels Corsicans to press into army, church, police, politics—any profession, in short, that grants them a morsel of authority. Since the clan organization exalts personal obligations at the expense of civic obligations, political struggle is among Corsicans a form of civil strife, and party success a form of brigandage. In Corsica as in Provence politics is a fine art, but here the leader is conspirator rather than demagogue. He leads by personal ascendancy rather than by genial *bonhomie*, and like the American boss relies on "deals" rather than on eloquence to achieve his purpose.

Flushed by the flattering reception of his work, Demolins has recently broken off his survey of French types to take up the more ambitious task of explaining, by the same method, the historical peoples. He aims at nothing less than dispensing with original human varieties, and deriving the attributes of each people, as well as the features of its social life, from the *route* it has followed. A volume on the *routes* of the ancient peoples has appeared, and we are promised another dealing with modern societies.

In this new reading of human evolution the word "race" hardly occurs. This biological notion is replaced by a sociological notion, the "type." For each *route* — that is to say, the physical environment which leaves its stamp upon a nascent folk,— there is a type. The steppe, the tundra, the forest, the desert, the valley, the seaport, the highland, each creates its type. Instead of "Mongol race" our author would say "the type of the steppe." The Lapps are "the type of the tundras," the Pelasgians "the type of the valley," the Dorians "the type of the mountain." An historical people is sometimes a type — the Chinese — or a particular combination of types — the Greeks.

Demolins does not expatiate on the influence of climate or the aspect of nature. Mental and moral characteristics are derived, not immediately from the physical environment, but from Work and from Domestic and Social Organization, which, in the main, is shaped by Work. They are consequences, not causes, of social conditions. To connect the social type with the natural environment, Demolins has carefully analyzed the early forms of economic life. Acting on Le Play's maxim, that mode of livelihood is the key to social science, he has unearthed a multitude of humble but significant facts bearing on the way men live. No man, however, does well to take the globe itself as his field. On the nomads of the steppe and the desert and on certain Mediterranean peoples, Demolins is well informed and delightful; but where his facts are meagre, he is more ingenious than convincing.

We realize the merits of his method, however, when we turn to the similar attempt of Matteuzzi to exalt environment at the expense of race. The Italian champions a telluric determinism, whereas that of the Frenchman is economic. He would account for a people by the influences of its historic seat, while Demolins seeks out the *route* that formed the people in its plastic period. Believ-

ing in the inheritance of acquired characters, he attributes to the physical environment a cumulative influence. It is a graving tool that cuts a little deeper each generation. Demolins, on the other hand, steers clear of physiological assumptions. The only fixation of traits he will recognize is that which occurs by means of social structure and tradition. When we add that Matteuzzi, ignoring the rôle of the individual genius, would gather into the net of his formula even the religious, speculative, and artistic products of a ripe civilization, the appraisal of his work is no longer difficult.

The importance of race in social philosophy has been discussed by Professor Ripley, and his adverse decision is the more weighty because he believes in race as a physical fact. He goes with the craniologist, in finding three races in the present population of western Europe; but he is not so ready as Lapouge, Sergi, or Bertillon, to connect psychic traits with physical traits. If comparison of head form, tint, and stature shows that two populations — say highlanders and lowlanders or North Italians and South Italians — are of different races, the “anthropo-sociologist” is apt to hinge on this fact all their moral and social diversities. Where Demolins applies geography as the key to local diversities, Lapouge applies anthropology. Professor Ripley, on the other hand, is chary of ethnic explanations of differences between districts in respect to domestic gregariousness, political conservatism, or frequency of suicide or divorce. He concludes: “Most of the social phenomena we have noted as peculiar to the areas occupied by the Alpine type are the necessary outcome, not of racial proclivities, but rather of a geographical and social isolation characteristic of the habitat of this race. The ethnic type is still pure, for the very same reason that social phenomena are primitive. Wooden ploughs pointed with stone, blood revenge, an undiminished birth-rate, and relative purity of physical type are

all alike derivatives from a common cause,—isolation directly physical and coincidently social. We discover, primarily, an influence of environment where others perceive phenomena of ethnic inheritance.”

On this matter of social isolation some very beautiful work has been done in the course of the last ten years. M. Leroy-Beaulieu set the pace by his brilliant success in using isolation as the key to the Jewish enigma. The vulgar persist in regarding the traits of the Jew as a race endowment. They stigmatize this or that propensity of his as “Oriental” or “Semitic,” and therewith consider the matter ended. The Frenchman perceived that the Jews are not a race, but a people, and set himself to explain how their characteristics have risen naturally from Work and Surroundings.

The Jewish type formed behind the double chain of barriers that for centuries separated the orthodox Jews from the European community; the restrictions of the mediæval Christians which penned them up in the Ghetto, and the Mosaic law which separated them from the *goïm* by a fence of rite and ceremonial observance. The traits of the type developed under these two exclusions,—one offensive, the other defensive,—express for the most part the stress of social conditions. The Jew has an incomparable value sense because for generations he was forced into trade and money changing. He esteems learning because the distinction of the scholar was open to him, but not that of the warrior or statesman. He clings to his religion as all dispossessed peoples cling to the rock of ancestral tradition amid the devouring waves of assimilation. He has his passions and impulses under prudent control, as happens always with unwarlike people long schooled in trade, city life, and money dealings. He lacks in sense of honor because the impulses radiating from chivalry had no access to him. He takes to ruse and hypocrisy because so long treated as a social pariah. If he has a double code

of ethics, it is because persecution has developed in him an intense tribal consciousness and a vivid sense of difference from Christians. He has the domestic virtues because family life has been his refuge from the injustices and insults of social life. The Jew is, then, a product; and many of the peculiarities charged to his Semitic blood will disappear with the complete disappearance of the conditions that produced them.

To Miss Schreiner, also, we owe some golden pages on the genesis of a type in isolation. Throughout the world the half-breeds of juxtaposed higher and lower races have been proverbial for viciousness. The universal popular verdict is that the mongrel is born with a tendency to be deceitful, cowardly, licentious, and without self-respect. This double tincture of evil is commonly laid to crossing, heredity in such case transmitting to the offspring the vices of both parents and the virtues of neither. It was left to Miss Schreiner to light up this enigma, and to show that the depravity of the half-caste is a problem for the sociologist rather than the physiologist.

The secret is that the half-caste issues from an irregular union and is without family or people. Morally he is derelict, drifting forlornly between two societies but belonging to neither. Scorned by the whites and despising the blacks, there is no social place for him; and so he lacks the steadying influence of his kind. The pure black "is in a society which has its own stern social standards and ideals, by living up to which he may still become an object of admiration and respect to his fellows, and above all to himself." "His tribe may be broken up, but he still feels himself an integral part of a great people, up to whose standards he is bound to live, and in whose eyes as in his own he is one of the goodliest and the completest creatures on God's earth." These race standards which the sheer pressure of common opinion forces into the soul of the individual do not reach the half-caste. The Kaffir



has the honor of a Kaffir, the white man the honor of a white; but there is no half-caste honor because no self-conscious race of half-castes generating the ideals and public opinion that support a social line of conduct. The half-caste is simply a fine clinical case of social isolation. What more striking proof could there be that morality, for the most part, takes its rise in human relations!

How far does Work create diversity of character? On this topic no one has been more ingenious than Professor Veblen. He accounts for the alienation of workingmen from the Church on the ground that the members of the artisan class "are in an especial degree exposed to the characteristic intellectual and spiritual stress of modern organized industry, which requires a constant recognition of the undisguised phenomena of impersonal matter-of-fact sequence and an unreserved conformity to the law of cause and effect." Such experiences tend to derange animistic habits of thought.

The great gulf between business men and workingmen in type of thinking he ascribes to the different discipline involved in pecuniary as contrasted with industrial employments. The differentiation of these has proceeded so far that nowadays in many branches large bodies of workers have but an incidental contact with the business side of the enterprise, while a minority have little other concern with the enterprise than its pecuniary management. Now, in the pecuniary occupations, men work within the lines and under the guidance of the great institution of ownership, with its ramifications of custom and legal right; while, in the industrial occupations, men are in their work attentive to natural law, and relatively free from the constraint of conventional norms of truth and validity. The latter fact explains the thriftlessness and lack of money wisdom among workingmen, even the high-priced experts. To it, also, is due the spread of socialism,—a movement which, quite unlike agrarian and

like manifestations of class discontent, does not aim to affect the distribution of property, but to do away with it altogether. On the other hand, the activities of the business man, having more to do with competing, bargaining, and the getting, holding, and protecting of property, tend to conserve predatory habits and aptitudes, to root them in the creed of property, to train them to believe in competition rather than co-operation, to kill any artistic interest in industrial operations, and to dispose them to appraise every process and product at its money worth.

From occupation it is but a step to economic relations as a cause of differentiation.

The fundamental thesis of Professor Veblen's remarkable book is that the possession of means sufficient to exempt from productive labor moulds so subtly the notions of utility, of fitness, of right, and of beauty that in the course of time the wealthy become spiritually a distinct type, so recognized by all the world. His consummate analysis shows that in every age and society the "gentleman," although he may be — quite incidentally — an epitome of human excellences, is, genetically considered, the finished product of the views, canons, and standards that develop inevitably, albeit unconsciously, in a leisure class by sheer virtue of its pecuniary independence.

Why is this class conservative? "Wisdom," say its friends. "Self-interest," say its critics. But to Professor Veblen men are not so rational. The wealthy leisure class is conservative in temper because it is sheltered from the stress of those economic exigencies which impinge on other classes and mould their habits of thought to new conditions. There is nothing to develop in its members that degree of uneasiness with the existing order which alone can induce any body of men to give up habitual views and modes of life.

In like vein Mrs. Stetson, who has written a book to show that many of the proverbial feminine traits, far from

being marks of sex, are simply consequences of the economic dependence of women on men. The exclusion of woman from working on her own account makes her a kind of parasite, and develops in her the parasite's powers of absorption and tenacity. Seeing that her economic fate depends on her being able to win and hold man, she invests too much of her personality in sex attraction, and becomes "oversexed." Because she is shut from the active world within the four walls of the home, she is limited in her information, her ideas, her thought processes, and her judgment. Because she throws her whole being into the highly personal "home" relations, woman magnifies the personal and ignores the general, is unwilling to "stand in line" or "take turn," is deficient in sense of justice and belated in commercial or civic morality, is exaggerated in her devotion to her own and in ministration to their personal needs, but weak in devotion to the corporate welfare. In fact, the sexuo-economic relation, if unmitigated, arrests woman's moral development at the stage of primitive virtues — and vices. The fact that in her marital tutelage she is always being praised or blamed for her conduct develops in her a hair-trigger conscience; but she is apt to be purblind to law, justice, desert. She lives in a forcing bed of sensitiveness to distinctions of right and wrong, but lacks the broad judgment that alone can guide and govern this sensitiveness.

What a broad clearing in the jungle! Hitherto we have assumed that men and women are played upon by the same influences, and so their differences in character must be laid to sex. But "sex," like "race," is the fetich of the lazy. By putting her finger on economic dependence rather than on "love," Mrs. Stetson has closed a new circuit. Woman, such as Schopenhauer saw her, has something in common with slaves, courtiers, on-hangers generally. Any human being that must depend not on labor but on closeness of attachment to some other

human being, will develop many "feminine" traits. "Woman" is by no means synonymous with "human female." Certain proclivities supposed to reach bed-rock are found to root in the surface soil of modifiable social conditions. After Lester F. Ward, no one has done more than Mrs. Stetson to show that the woman question is for the sociologist as well as the biologist.

Another example of the power of economic relations to generate a mental type is furnished by Professor Turner in his study of Western influence. The reason why we have produced an Americanism tangent to European thought is that our national character has formed in the presence of a West. By "West" is meant not an area, but a condition. It is the region where the institutions and ideas of an older society are being transformed by the influence of free land. "A new environment is suddenly entered, freedom of opportunity is opened, the cake of custom is broken, and new activities, new lines of growth, new institutions, and new ideals are brought into existence." Although this primitive society develops, differentiates, becomes "East," the early impress abides; and moreover a new West springs up further on to emit fresh impulses of equality and individualism. "Decade after decade, West after West, this rebirth of American society has gone on, has left its traces behind it, and has reacted on the East."

If the democratic temper pervades a community because opportunity is open, manhood at a premium, birth and inherited station at a discount, and earning power fairly uniform, then we ought to conclude that colonies owe their democracy, not to their newness, but to their free land. Not escape from traditions of subserviency, but the high economic potential of the common man, is the cause of their political and social democracy. If this be so, everything depends on the relations of the people to the land. By princely grants to the few it is possible to root

feudalism in the wilderness. The strong Tory aristocratic spirit that showed itself in the American proprietary colonies was the result of great estates. In the South, aristocracy flourished with the plantation system and languished in the regions where small holdings prevail.

California, when the gold-seekers reached it, was a young country; yet Spanish grants had permitted a semi-feudal society to arise. Spanish-America, in fact, unlike our quarter-sectioned West, never started right and never proved a nursery of democratic ideals. The Spaniards, moreover, grazed their West; and pastoralism, from the huge stock-raising farms of the old Narragansett planters to the wide *rancherías* of Argentina and the vast "sheep runs" of New South Wales, tends to build up a territorial aristocracy for the same reason probably that prehistoric pastoralism developed the patriarchy. It is agricultural or mining communities with widely diffused ownership that tend towards economic independence and equality, and are the natural foundations of American, Canadian, and Australian democracy. We shall see if there is a like reaction from Siberia, the only virgin region in the temperate zone now coming under the plough of the white man.

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[*To be concluded.*]

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